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Abstract: We study the environmental regulation of industrial activities that are organized as projects. Applications arise in con-
struction, ship and aircraft building, and film making, among other industries. Relative to manufacturing, environmental regulation
is different in project-based industries, due to the uniqueness and geographical diversity of projects, and a lack of product takeback
programs. Because the amount of waste and pollution generated by project companies can be large, regulators need environmental
policies to ensure reduction of waste and pollution. We consider a regulator who attempts to maximize social welfare. We model
this problem as a bilevel nonlinear program. The upper level regulator specifies waste reduction targets, which the lower level
project companies meet using waste stream reduction and remediation of pollution, while attempting to control their project costs.
We find that high waste diversion targets lead to outcomes with little pollution, but excessive project costs and only modest waste
stream reduction. Projects that have lower task precedence density, or that have pollutants with different environmental impacts,
show larger increases in project cost and time resulting from regulation. We describe a subsidy for waste stream reduction that
coordinates the system, and we estimate the value of coordination. We also describe a bonus that encourages truthful reporting by
project companies, and evaluate the relative cost and effectiveness of the subsidy and the bonus. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Naval Research Logistics 62: 228–247, 2015
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1. INTRODUCTION
Various economic activities, including construction, man-
ufacturing, and transportation, are responsible for increasing
environmental pollution. The resulting footprint exceeded the
Earth’s biocapacity by 50% in 2007 [80]. One of the pri-
mary causes of this environmental imbalance is the amount
of waste generated in industrialized nations. In response, reg-
ulators have been imposing environmental laws to ensure the
diversion of waste from landfills. Although environmental
regulations in manufacturing industries have been around for
a long time and studied in the literature quite extensively
(e.g., [4, 43]), similar regulatory practices in project-based
industries are relatively new. As we discuss below, enforce-
ment of and compliance with environmental regulations in
project-based industries present challenges that are differ-
ent from those in manufacturing industries. For this rea-
son, in this article, we focus on environmental regulation in
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project-based industries from project managers’, as well as
from regulators’, perspective.
One fifth of the world’s economic activity is organized as a
project [56]. As a consequence, there are several environmen-
tal regulation programs that are mandated in project-based
industries. Examples of such industries include, but are not
limited to, ship building, aircraft building, film making, and
construction. Both ship and aircraft building projects are sub-
ject to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act that
regulates the treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous
wastes and solid wastes as well as the Clean Air Act that reg-
ulates emissions limits, initial performance testing, ongoing
compliance monitoring, and reporting [6, 57]. The film mak-
ing industry is regulated by the Integrated Waste Management
Act in California that required 50% waste reduction by 2000
[51]. In the United Kingdom, BS 8909 Standards for the film
industry require waste removal, and aim at 10% reduction in
carbon footprint by 2020 [9, 31]. For the construction indus-
try, CALGreen establishes green building standards within
California, and mandates construction waste reduction, dis-
posal, and recycling [12]. It requires diversion of at least 50%
of nonhazardous construction and demolition debris from
© 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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landfills. Similarly, in the District of Columbia, the Green
Building Act of 2006 requires that all public buildings meet
the U.S. Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy
and Environmental Design (LEED) certification standards
for environmental performance [67]. Finally, the Sustainable
DC plan introduces construction waste management require-
ments that will apply to all buildings in the district by 2032
[68]. Also, the U.K. government has identified a target of
reduction in construction, demolition, and excavation waste
to landfills by 50% by 2012, relative to 2008 [37]. For the
sake of brevity, in the remainder of the paper we use building
construction (and related environmental regulations) as our
exemplar industry. Still, our model and analysis apply read-
ily to any environmentally sensitive industry, including those
discussed above, where activities are typically organized as
projects.
Under environmental regulations, identifying the most cost
effective means of compliance is a significant issue for many
firms operating projects. For example, compliance with CAL-
Green substantially increases the cost of many projects,
due to the additional design work necessary to meet the
requirements, as well as inspection and other onsite activ-
ities [35, 58]. In addition to cost, regulatory requirements
cause an increase in project completion time. For example,
time consuming onsite inspections from local and state build-
ing departments are necessary to determine compliance with
CALGreen. Consequently, our paper studies the implications
of such regulation for the decisions of project management
companies that perform tasks which, if not remediated, pol-
lute the environment. In particular, we identify the most cost
effective means of compliance for project firms, and evaluate
the increase in project cost and completion time that results
from compliance.
Environmental regulation in project-based industries
involves unique challenges that are different from those faced
in manufacturing industries. First, project-based industries do
not provide the same opportunities as manufacturing indus-
tries do for using extended producer responsibility type reg-
ulations, where the company which puts the product into
the market is responsible for ensuring proper treatment of
products discarded by customers, to resolve environmental
concerns [50]. Second, unlike in manufacturing operations,
each project is typically considered as unique [81], which
makes it difficult for a regulator to design “one size fits all”
environmental standards that work effectively for all projects.
Another difference between manufacturing and project-based
industries is a lack of repetition of tasks in the latter [2], which
makes it harder to learn the effect of different responses to
environmental policy. Finally, projects are often geographi-
cally diverse [59], which complicates the implementation of
environmental remediation policies. For all these reasons, it
is important to study environmental regulation specifically
for project-based industries. In particular, we identify how
different environmental regulations impact project compa-
nies’ responses, which in turn affects the environmental
benefit and total social welfare that result from the regulation.
The environmental economics literature compares the
effectiveness of various policy tools that optimize social
welfare and the amount of waste disposal. See, for exam-
ple, [54, 76, 10, 77]. The operations management literature
also investigates various environmental policy tools and their
implications, especially in manufacturing industries. Envi-
ronmental regulation is accomplished through three types
of programs, each of which contains various options, as we
now discuss. The first type is market-based programs, which
include subsidies, taxes, tax exemptions, tradeable permits,
and incentives (e.g., [52, 63, 14, 41, 36]). The second type is
voluntary certification programs (e.g., [73, 22]). Most closely
related to our work is the third type, direct regulation pro-
grams, where a regulator states explicit, legally binding tar-
gets for remediation, such as the CALGreen Code discussed
above. Direct regulation programs are widely used not only
in project-based industries, but also in manufacturing indus-
tries (e.g., [82, 4, 55]). Our work focuses on direct regulation
because project-based industries, including construction, are
typically controlled by that type of environmental program.
Our work is apparently the first that explores the impact of
environmental regulation on project companies’ decisions.
Project-based industries are responsible for several envi-
ronmental impacts, such as various emissions, waste gener-
ation, soil erosion, noise pollution, and effects on flora and
fauna. Among these environmental impacts, our work focuses
on pollution and waste generation because these are com-
monly accepted as the creators of significant environmental
problems across many industries. Regulators also typically
focus on waste stream reduction and pollution remediation.
For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
lists eight regulatory categories by topic as air, water, waste,
pesticides, toxic substances, land and clean-up, cross-cutting
issues (e.g., asbestos and lead), and emergencies [29]. Most of
these topics fall within the scope of waste created by project
companies.
We focus on direct regulations which impose a uniform
target for companies, while allowing some flexibility in how
this target is met [62]. For example, CALGreen sets the waste
diversion target as 50%. For project companies, there are
two main options for reducing the waste to meet the targets.
The first option is waste stream reduction, which reduces
the waste generated by various tasks in the project [11]. The
second option is direct remediation of the waste generated.
In either case, waste reduction typically results in longer
project time and higher cost. Therefore, it is important for
project companies to identify the most cost effective means
of compliance among the available alternatives.
Waste stream reduction activities decrease the amount
of pollutant created by the project tasks. This contributes
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to meeting direct regulatory constraints, as the pollution
reduction requirement is defined as a fraction of the amount
of pollutant generated before waste stream reduction [12].
For example, leftover insulation material, which counts as
construction waste, can be installed in interior wall cavities
or on top of attic insulation [64]. This requires additional
construction time, but helps meet waste reduction require-
ments. Also, additional insulation benefits the inhabitants of
the building and increases consumer benefit.
We also consider two types of direct remediation. The first
and most immediate type is simultaneous remediation. In our
model, simultaneous remediation is performed concurrently
with the task being performed by the same operators who
perform the task. There are various reasons for using simul-
taneous remediation. For example, some hazardous waste
needs to be removed immediately and, therefore, simulta-
neous remediation is the only option [39]. Simultaneous
remediation increases task time. When it is used, no succes-
sor task can start until the remediation has been completed
and the task has been certified as complete [7].
An alternative type of direct remediation is delayed reme-
diation, which is performed at the end of the project. This
remediation activity can be outsourced to external providers
[11]. Many projects contain substances that require expert
handling by a specialist remediation company. In this case,
the remediation company has to remove materials using
proper containment procedures and assess the site for other
environmentally sensitive materials not identified by the
project company. For example, even the simplest remedia-
tion activities such as recycling of waste components, like
cardboard or wood, add to project time, if outsourced at the
end of the project. This is because most remediation compa-
nies do not accept mixed loads [17], which necessitates onsite
separation of construction waste [64]. As a result, even when
outsourced, delayed remediation activities increase project
completion time.
We model the problem faced by the regulator and the
project companies as a nonlinear bilevel program to maxi-
mize social welfare, which includes project companies’ cost,
environmental impact, and consumer benefit. As we study
the implications of the decisions of a regulator regarding reg-
ulatory parameter choices, we follow [4] and [3] by treating
legislative regulation as endogenous. Then, project compa-
nies comply with the regulation either by conducting waste
stream reduction activities or remediating their waste.
Two other issues that affect the decisions of the regula-
tor and the project companies are addressed in our work.
Although the upper level decision maker (regulator) may pre-
fer certain solutions for the project companies, when those
companies minimize their cost, different solutions may result.
As a result, the solutions of the regulator and the project
companies are not naturally coordinated. Hence, we con-
sider how to coordinate the system using a subsidy. Also,
a regulator who seeks to design optimal regulations requires
information, such as the cost and amount of waste gener-
ated. For example, CALGreen requires project companies
to develop a waste management plan before construction
begins. The waste management plan should include the esti-
mated amount of waste materials that will be generated, and
diversion strategies for those materials [12, 13]. However,
project companies do not necessarily report true information
regarding the estimated amount of waste generated and the
associated cost of diversion or remediation. Therefore, asym-
metry of information is an issue that may significantly affect
project companies’ decisions as well as the success of the
regulation [53]. This issue of information asymmetry in the
context of sustainability has apparently not been studied in
the operations management literature. Hence, we describe a
bonus structure that incentivizes project companies to report
their information truthfully.
Our research provides several insights for project compa-
nies and regulators. For project companies, it is important
to estimate by how much project cost and time increase due
to regulation, to quote to project owners. Our results show
that in industries where project structures are sparse, or the
regulated pollutants have different levels of environmental
impact, the percentage increase in project cost is higher. Also,
when the waste diversion target is small, project companies
should comply by either using waste stream reduction or
remediation, but not both. We also provide some insights
for regulators. First, social welfare is a highly nonmonotonic
function of the waste diversion targets, which underlines both
the importance and the difficulty of setting optimal policy
parameters. Through a computational study, we identify the
implications of various suboptimal policy parameter choices
and make observations to guide regulators. For example,
imposing unreasonably high waste diversion targets increases
the cost and completion time of projects, as expected. How-
ever, it does not result in any further waste stream reduction
beyond that from the welfare maximizing waste diversion
target.
Finally, we know of no other work that studies environ-
mental regulatory constraints within the project management
literature. However, there is a substantial literature about var-
ious other constraints which project companies may face.
For example, resource (e.g., money, labor) constraints have
been studied extensively (e.g., [24, 66, 46]). This literature
aims to develop algorithms and heuristics that find optimal or
near-optimal solutions for resource-constrained project man-
agement problems. We refer the reader to [34, 8] for reviews.
In this article, our aim is not to develop a solution heuris-
tic but to provide intuition to regulators and managers about
the effects of environmental constraints within project-based
industries. Other recent literature focuses on some practical
constraints, including but not limited to, customer require-
ments (e.g., scope change requests [44], quality constraints
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[78], and sourcing constraints [45, 1]), and identifies several
ways to address those constraints. For example, it is argued
that improving integration with concurrent operations such
as logistics [45], improving information flow and reducing
uncertainty [78], taking proactive measures [1], and adopt-
ing a life cycle project management approach [42] would
improve project performance. We contribute to this literature
by identifying what type of waste diversion (i.e., remedi-
ation or reduction) would improve project performance by
minimizing compliance cost under environmental regulatory
constraints.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we motivate the problem studied by examining
a real world example. In Section 3, we introduce our nota-
tion, model, and assumptions. In Section 4, we discuss how a
project company and the regulator can identify their optimal
policies. In Section 5, we provide a detailed numerical exam-
ple which demonstrates that the welfare function is highly
nonmonotonic. In Section 6, we first design a subsidy that
aligns the objectives of the regulator and the project com-
panies, and we study the use of a bonus that ensures truthful
reporting by the project companies. In Section 7, we study the
effects of various policy parameter choices. Finally, Section
8 contains a conclusion and some suggestions for future
research.
2. A REAL WORLD EXAMPLE
To illustrate the practicality and importance of the prob-
lem of environmental regulation in project companies, we
describe a construction project example that uses real data.
This project is based on data from [33] and [75]. For sim-
plicity and conciseness, we combine the tasks of the project
into six subgroups, as shown in Fig. 1. Doing so defines the
six tasks that are shown in Table 1. The pollutant quanti-
ties generated by each task, and the times and costs required
for their remediation, appear in Tables 2 and 3, respectively
[71, 38, 40]. Additional details of the example are available
from the corresponding author.
In the absence of regulation, the project is completed in 36
days. In this schedule, all the tasks are critical except for task
D, which has a slack of 5 days. To provide a basis for compar-
ing different solutions, we scale the project completion time
Figure 1. Construction project network structure.
Table 1. Main tasks in construction project and task durations
Duration
Task Definition (days)
A Earthworks 1
B Foundation and structure 15
C Exterior walls masonry + windows/doors fitting 10
D Plumbing and services fixing 5
E Interior walls 5
F Ceiling 5
Table 2. Amount of wastes generated by main tasks.
Concrete/ Brick/
(In kg’s) Wood ceramic masonry Packaging
Task A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Task B 1279.48 391.14 0.00 392.73
Task C 0.00 132.59 367.93 811.15
Task D 0.00 66.29 0.00 0.00
Task E 0.00 0.00 0.00 1101.11
Task F 0.00 0.00 367.93 260.60
Table 3. Time and weighted cost for remediation of pollution.
Concrete/ Brick/
Per kg Wood ceramic masonry Packaging
Time of delayed reme-
diation (in days)
0.00114 0.00091 0.00073 0.0016
Time of simultane-
ous remediation (in
days)
0.00208 0.00208 0.00208 N/A
Cost of delayed reme-
diation (in $’s)
0.44 0.34 0.27 0.56
Cost of simultaneous
remediation (in $’s)
0.08 0.02 0.12 N/A
into dollar units, that is, $3,600. As increasing regulation tar-
gets are imposed on the project, additional cost is incurred. If
all the four pollutants are fully remediated, then the additional
project cost is approximately $2,535, for a total of $6,135.
Consider the remediation of concrete/ceramic waste as an
example. To minimize its cost, the project company first uses
simultaneous remediation for task D, to take advantage of the
slack time of that task. If additional concrete/ceramic waste
diversion is required, this is accomplished using simultaneous
remediation for tasks B and/or C.
To see how remediation affects the project, we consider a
simple situation where the four pollutants are remediated in
the same proportion. Table 4 shows how additional project
cost and project delay increase with the proportion of waste
remediated, as a percentage of the initial project cost of
$3,600 without remediation. Due to the existence of task slack
time, project delay first increases at a lower rate, and then at
a higher rate when no further slack time is available.
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Table 4. Impact of remediation on project cost and duration.
Proportion of
waste remediated 10 (%) 20 (%) 50 (%) 80 (%) 100 (%)
Additional project
cost (%)
4.86 9.72 24.30 38.88 48.60
Delay in project
completion (%)
1.88 4.06 10.72 17.38 21.82
This problem is further complicated where the project
company has an additional option to divert waste, that is, to
invest in waste reduction efforts to reduce pollutant quantities
generated by the tasks. Also, the regulator needs to determine
the proportion of each pollutant to be diverted. These issues
are considered below.
3. PRELIMINARIES
This section describes our notation, Sections 3.1 and
3.2 formally describe the problems faced by the individual
project company and the regulator, respectively. Throughout
this section, we state and justify the main assumptions of our
model when they are most relevant. We model the problem
studied using bilevel programming [26], due to the presence
of two types of decision makers, a regulator and multiple
project companies.
The regulator is a higher level decision maker who sets
waste reduction targets. At the lower level are s project
companies, each of which owns a project that is potentially
affected by the regulation. Not all project companies are
affected by regulation. For example, under CALGreen, the
requirements apply to nonresidential additions of 2000 square
feet or more. Therefore, we consider only projects that are
sufficiently large to be regulated.
NOTATION: We define the following notation for prob-
lem parameters:
s = number of projects
m = number of types of pollutants
nh = number of tasks in project h
thj = deterministic task processing time for task j in
project h
qhij = removable amount of pollutant i generated by task
j in project h
uhij = time required for simultaneous remediation of one
unit of pollutant i of task j in project h
u′hi = time required for delayed remediation of one unit
of pollutant i in project h
u′′hij = time required for waste reduction activity to divert
one unit of pollutant i of task j in project h
κhij = cost required for simultaneous remediation of one
unit of pollutant i of task j in project h
κ ′hi = cost required for delayed remediation of one unit of
pollutant i in project h
τhij = cost required for reducing one squared unit of
pollutant i of task j in project h
i = environmental benefit from processing one unit of
pollutant i.
Based on any practical situation, the number of pollutants,
m, is small. Each project contains acyclic precedence rela-
tions of the form i → j , indicating that task j cannot start
processing until the completion of task i and task i’s simul-
taneous remediation. Without loss of generality, for each
project h, we assume that the task indexed by nh is a dummy
task that incurs zero processing time and must be immedi-
ately preceded by any task j < nh satisfying {k|j → k} = ∅.
Consequently, the completion time of task nh is the maxi-
mum completion time of all the tasks of project h. However,
it may be followed by delayed remediation before the project
completes.
ASSUMPTION 1: We consider the problem using a
project time line with respect to a schedule that has been
contracted with a client.
As we consider the development of an ongoing regulatory
policy that is to be applied to a variety of projects, a single
period model without end effects is appropriate and sufficient.
Our model considers project completion time as a measure of
performance, but this time is measured against a contracted
schedule with the client rather than against an abstract time
horizon.
ASSUMPTION 2: We consider several project companies
with a single project, who wish to minimize its cost, and we
assume that all projects are completed.
This assumption implies that our model does not allow
a project company to have multiple projects. This is a nec-
essary assumption to keep the exposition clear, and focus
on the main results without biasing the results with potential
tradeoffs between the various options which we are studying.
For example, the inclusion of learning effects or economies
of scope or scale would change the tradeoff between waste
remediation and reduction. We believe these are important
topics that should be studied as future research problems.
We also assume that all projects are completed, because to
do otherwise allows the costs of canceled projects to change
the tradeoffs involved in waste remediation and reduction
decisions. For example, it might be the case that a project
company would be more reluctant than otherwise to invest
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in waste reduction activities for a project if it was being con-
sidered for cancelation. Hence, waste remediation might be
used more extensively as an alternative for this project.
3.1. Project h’s Problem
In project h, we define the following decision variables:
xhij = amount of pollutant i for task j that is simultaneously
remediated
yhij = amount of pollutant i for task j that is delayed
remediated
zhij = reduction in pollutant i for task j through waste
reduction activities
Chj = completion time of processing task j and its waste
reduction and simultaneous remediation
Ch max = completion time of project h and all its remedia-
tion.
ASSUMPTION 3: The cost of reducing the amount of pol-
lutant is convex and increasing in the amount of pollutant
diverted.
We assume that the marginal cost of waste stream reduc-
tion activities, such as installing left-over insulation material,
increases as waste reduction efforts become more intensive.
For example, if the amount of pollutant i from task j of
project h is qhij , then the project company can invest in waste
reduction efforts to reduce it to qhij − zhij , where zhij is a
decision variable that represents how much waste is elimi-
nated. The cost of reducing the amount of pollutant is convex
and increasing in zhij , that is, the amount of pollutant that is
diverted from the waste stream. The assumption of increasing
marginal costs for achieving higher levels of waste reduction
is common in the environmental economics literature [5, 15].
Empirical evidence also suggests that at higher levels of waste
reduction the marginal abatement cost rises [15], which is
consistent with convex and increasing marginal waste stream
reduction costs.
Examples of waste stream reduction opportunities for con-
struction project companies include grinding and using mate-
rials such as lumber, wood, pallets, and bricks on-site. For
example, unused or damaged bricks can be ground and mixed
with other materials to be used as a driveway subbase. This
process reduces construction waste and thus also remedia-
tion requirements [65]. Similarly, lumber, wood, and pallets
can be ground and utilized on-site for various purposes. One
opportunity is using such ground wood as mulch which also
provides better erosion control [65]. Another example is
adjusting floor-to-ceiling heights to reduce the expected rate
of plasterboard wastage, typically by 10% [79].
ASSUMPTION 4: The cost of waste remediation is linear.
Linear cost of remediation (and particularly recycling) is a
common assumption in the literature (e.g., [27, 16, 4]). Fur-
thermore, for construction waste disposal third-party remedi-
ation companies generally quote a price per pound or volume
[71, 38, 40, 48]. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the
cost of remediation is linear.
We let bi denote the minimum proportion of pollutant i that
the regulator requires to be diverted through waste stream
reduction or remediation. The project company solves the
following optimization problem, where δ is a constant that
scales Ch max to be additive with the other costs.
min fh = δCh max +
m∑
i=1
nh∑
j=1
[κhij xhij + κ ′hiyhij + τhij z2hij ]
(1)
s.t. Chj ≥ Chk + thj +
m∑
i=1
uhij xhij
+
m∑
i=1
u′′hij zhij , k → j , j , k = 1, . . . , nh (2)
Ch max ≥ Cnh + u′hi
nh∑
j=1
yhij , i = 1, . . . , m (3)
xhij + yhij + zhij ≤ qhij , i = 1, . . . , m; j = 1, . . . , nh
(4)
nh∑
j=1
(xhij + yhij + zhij ) ≥ bi
nh∑
j=1
qhij , i = 1, . . . , m (5)
xhij , yhij , zhij ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , m, j = 1, . . . , nh. (6)
In the objective (1), the term Ch max is the completion time
of project h and all its remediation activities. The objective
function minimizes the total dollar cost of the project com-
pletion time, plus the cost of remediating pollutants from the
various tasks, plus the cost of waste stream reduction. Con-
straint (2) enforces the project’s precedence requirements.
The time thj of task j is extended by the total time spent
on simultaneous remediation of that task’s pollutants and
the total time spent for waste stream reduction activities.
Constraint (3) defines the completion time of project h and
all its delayed remediation. Constraint (4) requires that the
total amount of the remediated and reduced pollutants can-
not exceed the total amount of pollutant from each task.
Constraint (5) enforces the regulator’s lower limit bi on the
proportion of type i pollution that is either eliminated through
waste stream reduction activities or remediated.
3.2. Regulator’s Problem
The regulator, as an upper level decision maker, sets val-
ues for variables b = (b1, . . . , bm), and then the lower level
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project companies respond. There may be a technologically
feasible range for b, so we assume b ≤ bmax, where bmax
denotes the maximum waste diversion rate that is practically
possible and bmax ≤ 1. These values apply to all projects.
ASSUMPTION 5: The regulator wishes to maximize
social welfare, including several components.
The operations management literature typically models
social welfare as the sum of three components, as discussed
below [49, 4, 53, 43]. Following the literature, we assume
that the regulator’s objective is to maximize a social welfare
function W, which is the sum of company value, environmen-
tal gain, and consumer benefit. Moreover, these are the main
performance measures that are impacted by the decisions we
consider. We describe these three components in turn.
1. Company Value: It costs f h for the project com-
pany to complete project h. We assume the owner of
project h pays a fixed amount Rh, independent of f h,
to the project company. In addition, the owner pays a
proportion kh ≤ 1 of the cost f h to the project com-
pany. This is a traditional fixed price plus cost sharing
contract, with risk shared between the contractor and
the project owner [60]. For example, under CAL-
Green, the increase in project cost due to compliance
is typically reflected in the price which the building
owner pays [30]. Therefore, the value of the project
to the project company h is ph ≡ Rh + khfh − fh,
and the total value to all the project companies is
p =∑sh=1 ph ≡∑sh=1(Rh+khfh−fh). For each
project company h, maximizing ph is equivalent to
minimizing f h.
2. Environmental Gain: Some environmental gain i
is observed from remediation or reduction of each
unit of waste. See [4] and [3] for a discussion
of how environmental gain or impact parameters
are calculated. The linearity of total environmen-
tal benefit (respectively, damage) in the amount of
waste diverted (respectively, generated) is a common
assumption in the sustainable operations literature
(see, for example, [4, 53, 3, 43]) that we also adopt.
ASSUMPTION 6: The total environmental gain
is linear in the amount of waste diverted.
We denote the total environmental gain from waste
diversion of project h by eh ≡
∑m
i=1 i
∑nh
j=1(xhij +
yhij + zhij ). Thus, the total environmental gain from
all projects is e ≡∑sh=1 eh.
3. Consumer Benefit: We denote the consumer bene-
fit by ch for project h. We consider three compo-
nents of consumer benefit. First, a value, denoted
by Vh, is gained by consumers for the completion
of project h, for h = 1, . . . , s. Second, as we con-
sider a fixed price plus cost sharing contract, the
consumers need to pay
∑s
h=1(Rh + khfh) to utilize
the output of the project. Third, consumers bene-
fit from waste stream diversion. We model these
benefits as
∑s
h=1
∑m
i=1 λi
∑nh
j=1(xhij + yhij + zhij ),
where λi is the unit increase in consumer benefit as
the waste stream diversion of pollutant i increases.
There may be additional benefits of waste stream
reduction, besides diverting waste from landfills. For
example, using leftover insulation in wall cavities
reduces energy bills. Indeed, governmental organiza-
tions such as the EPA emphasize the additional ben-
efits of waste stream reduction for consumers [28].
We model the additional benefit from waste stream
reduction as
∑s
h=1
∑m
i=1
∑nh
j=1 λ
′
hij zhij , whereλ′hij is
the additional unit increase in consumer benefit as the
waste reduction increases. Therefore, the total con-
sumer benefit is
∑s
h=1(Vh +
∑m
i=1 λi
∑nh
j=1(xhij +
yhij + zhij ) + ∑mi=1∑nhj=1 λ′hij zhij − Rh − khfh).
However, given the assumption that all projects
are completed, we omit the constant term
∑s
h=1 Vh
and thus the total consumer benefit is c ≡∑s
h=1 
c
h =
∑s
h=1(
∑m
i=1 λi
∑nh
j=1(xhij + yhij +
zhij ) +∑mi=1∑nhj=1 λ′hij zhij − Rh − khfh).
From the above discussion, the regulator’s problem can be
written as:
max W =
s∑
h=1
(
p
h + eh + ch)
=
s∑
h=1
(Rh + khfh − fh)
+
s∑
h=1
m∑
i=1
(i + λi)
nh∑
j=1
(xhij + yhij + zhij )+
s∑
h=1
⎛
⎝ m∑
i=1
nh∑
j=1
λ′hij zhij − Rh − khfh
⎞
⎠ (7)
= −
s∑
h=1
fh +
s∑
h=1
m∑
i=1
(i + λi)
nh∑
j=1
(xhij + yhij
+ zhij ) +
s∑
h=1
m∑
i=1
nh∑
j=1
λ′hij zhij (8)
s.t. 0 ≤ bi ≤ bmax, i = 1, . . . , m, (9)
where f h is the minimum cost of project h, and xhij , yhij ,
and zhij are given by an optimal solution of project h’s prob-
lem (1)–(6), for any given b = (b1, . . . , bm). The objective
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W represents the social welfare function. The first term in (8)
is the project company’s cost, the second term is the envi-
ronmental and consumer benefit from waste diversion and
the third term is the additional consumer benefit from waste
stream reduction.
ASSUMPTION 7: At different points in our work, we
assume perfect information or asymmetric information.
Most of the operations management literature on sustain-
ability (e.g., [4, 63, 69, 53]) assumes perfect information, that
is, the regulator knows all the relevant information about the
manufacturer’s costs and resources. This assumption includes
the regulator knowing the unit waste diversion costs of all the
projects. This assumption is supported by [70], who propose a
scheme to approximate the unit remediation costs of the other
parties. We follow this assumption for our initial analysis, but
modify it in Section 6.
Finally, note that although we focus on the environmental
impact of waste, our model is general enough to be applied
to other environmental impacts faced in project-based indus-
tries, for example, dust emission or noise pollution. For
example, for the environmental impact under consideration,
if reduction is costly but not time consuming, then this would
be a special case of our model where the parameters uhij , u′hi ,
and u′′hij are set to zero.
4. UNCOORDINATED SOLUTIONS
We discuss how each project company and the regulator
can optimize their decision problems.
4.1. Project h’s Solution
We consider the problem faced by project company h in the
uncoordinated case. First, we show that a project company
has no incentive to invest more in waste reduction activi-
ties, or to remediate more pollutant, than is required by the
regulator.
LEMMA 1: An optimal solution to a project company’s
problem satisfies (5) with equality.
PROOF: The minimization objective of the project com-
pany is an increasing function of each xhij , yhij , and zhij
variable. 
4.2. Regulator’s Solution
We provide a discussion of how the regulator optimizes its
objective in the uncoordinated case. The regulator can maxi-
mize W over bi , xhij , yhij , zhij , and Chj , subject to Constraints
(2)–(6) and (9), where Constraint (5) is in equality form, else
the b vector found in an optimal solution can simply be 0, and
does not define the proportion of each pollutant to process.
Doing so optimizes the regulator’s objective, however the
values of xhij , yhij , zhij , and Chj obtained do not necessarily
optimize the project company’s problem for the chosen bi val-
ues. Hence, it may not be a “true solution” where the project
company makes the decisions that the regulator expects. In
this case, the regulator’s solution is not optimal.
For given b = (b1, . . . , bm), the minimum cost f h of
project h is unique, but there can be multiple optimal solu-
tions for xhij , yhij , zhij . The existence of multiple optimal
xhij , yhij , zhij solutions complicates the regulator’s decisions
about b = (b1, . . . , bm). We assume that, given minimization
of its own cost, a project company always maximizes the
social welfare. We provide an algorithm to solve the reg-
ulator’s problem under this assumption. Before presenting
the algorithm, we need to introduce the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) optimality conditions of the project company’s qua-
dratic program. To this end, we define αhkj , βhi , γhij ≥ 0 as
dual variables for Constraints (2), (3), and (4), respectively.
From Lemma 1, Constraint (5) always holds as an equality,
hence we define ηhi as a dual variable, which is not necessar-
ily nonnegative, for Constraint (5). The KKT conditions for
the minimization of the objective f h, subject to Constraints
(2)–(5), are
αhkj
(
Chk + thj +
m∑
i=1
uhij xhij +
m∑
i=1
u′′hij zhij − Chj
)
= 0,
k → j , j , k = 1, . . . , nh, (10)
βhi
⎛
⎝Cnh + u′hi
nh∑
j=1
yhij − Ch max
⎞
⎠ = 0, i = 1, . . . , m,
(11)
γhij (xhij + yhij + zhij − qhij ) = 0,
i = 1, . . . , m; j = 1, . . . , nh, (12)

(
fh +
∑
k→j
αhkj
(
Chk + thj +
m∑
i=1
uhij xhij
+
m∑
i=1
u′′hij zhij − Chj
)
+
∑
i
βhi
(
Cnh + u′hi
nh∑
j=1
yhij − Ch max
)
+
∑
i,j
γhij (xhij + yhij + zhij − qhij )
+
m∑
i=1
ηhi
(
bi
nh∑
j=1
qhij −
nh∑
j=1
(xhij + yhij + zhij )
))
= 0,
(13)
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Figure 2. Project network structure for Example 1. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlineli-
brary.com.]
where Constraint (13) specifies the first order condition of
the Lagrangian function over the variables xhij , yhij , zhij ,
Chj , and Ch max.
The regulator’s problem can be solved as a bilevel program,
using the following algorithm.
ALGORITHM 1: Allow the regulator to maximize W over
variables bi , xhij , yhij , zhij , and Chj , subject to constraints
(2)–(6), (9), and (10)–(13). This is an optimistic bilevel non-
linear program [19], where in the case of multiple optimal
solutions for a project company, the company chooses one
with maximum social welfare.
The bilevel nonlinear program in our paper is equivalent
to a leader-follower game, where the regulator is the leader
and the project companies are followers. In the next section,
we provide a detailed numerical example to demonstrate that
the welfare function is highly nonmonotonic, and therefore,
finding closed form analytical solutions is not tractable.
5. UNCOORDINATED SOLUTIONS: A
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
To have a better understanding of the optimal solution of
the project companies and the regulator when their decisions
are uncoordinated, we provide a detailed example. Consider
two projects with activity-on-node network structures, as
shown in Fig. 2. For simplicity, we focus on an example with
one pollutant, and hence for this section we omit the subscript
denoting the pollutant. Notation of a vector is indicated by
bold. For example, t1 = (t11, . . . , t1nh). The critical paths for
b = 0 are shown using bold lines in Fig. 2. For the pollutant
under consideration,  = 1.2 and λ = 0.5.
EXAMPLE 1: For Project 1, the task times are given as
t1 = (3, 3, 4, 1, 5, 2), whereas the remediation times are u1 =
(1.2, 1.5, 1, 1.7, 0.2, 1) and u′1 = 0.5. Time required for waste
reduction activities are u′′1 = (0.5, 0.8, 0.3, 0.5, 0.1, 0.3).
The cost of reducing one squared unit of pollutant is
τ 1 = (3, 5, 4, 2, 2, 3). The remediation costs are κ1 =
(0.6, 4, 1.2, 1, 0.7, 1.2) and κ ′1 = 1.5 for simultaneous and
delayed remediation, respectively. Finally, the amount of
pollutant from each task is q1 = (2.5, 4, 5, 3, 5, 4), and
the additional increase in consumer benefit as the waste
reduction increases is λ′1 = (16, 26.5, 21, 15.5, 7, 10.5). For
Project 2, the problem parameters are as follows: t2 =
(2, 1, 4, 2, 7, 2), u2 = (1, 2, 2, 6, 3, 1), u′2 = 1.7, u′′2 =
(0.3, 0.5, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2), τ 2 = (3, 5, 4.5, 2, 1, 2.5), κ2 =
(1, 2, 1, 1.5, 0.5, 1), κ ′2 = 0.3, q2 = (2.5, 6, 6, 1.5, 5, 4), and
λ′2 = (11.5, 21, 17.5, 21.5, 10.5, 16). Finally, let δ = 1.
We solve the project companies’ problem for b ∈
{0, 0.01, 0.02, . . . , 1}, and graph the total welfare and its com-
ponents in Fig. 3a. From the figure, we observe that the
total project cost and environmental gain are monotonically
increasing functions of b, whereas additional consumer ben-
efit is a monotone and weakly increasing function of b. As
the total welfare is defined as the sum of consumer benefit
and environmental gain minus project cost, the total welfare
function is a nonmonotone, mostly concave, function of b.
This feature of the objective function’s structure illustrates
the difficulty of finding optimal solutions as well as closed
form analytical solutions.
In this example, we identify the optimum value b∗ = 0.48
that maximizes the total welfare. Recall that consumer ben-
efit is a function of the weighted sum of waste reduction
of the project tasks (8). The optimal level of waste reduc-
tion, and thus the nonmonotonic shape of the total welfare
function are determined by the strategies of the project com-
panies for different waste diversion targets. From analyzing
the project companies’ response to increasing levels of b,
we have several observations. First, when b is small, each
project company complies with regulation by making small
changes in the waste stream reduction level, without perform-
ing any remediation. As the cost of decreasing the pollutant
level is convex and increasing in z, it is cheaper to make such
design changes for small values of z. The project company
stops investing in waste stream reduction activities when the
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Figure 3. Solution of Example 1: (a) change in total welfare com-
ponents as b increases; (b) change in consumer benefit for each
project as b increases. [Color figure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
related convex cost is higher than the cost of remediation
for the cheapest available task. At higher levels of b, the
project company begins using remediation to comply with
the regulation. Intuition suggests that the cheapest means of
compliance is through simultaneous remediation for the tasks
that are not on the critical path, however, this is not neces-
sarily the case. Although remediating the waste from a task
that is on the critical path increases the project completion
time, the project company may choose to do so when the cor-
responding cost of simultaneous remediation is sufficiently
low.
Once simultaneous remediation starts, as b increases, no
further investment is made in waste reduction activities until
the remediation opportunity is fully exploited. Suppose for
example that, at any b value, it is currently optimal to use
simultaneous remediation. Then, the project company con-
tinues using simultaneous remediation to comply with more
stringent regulation, until either (i) all the available slack time
for the particular task is used up for remediation and thus the
task becomes critical, or (ii) all the waste generated from
this task is remediated, even though there is still some slack
time available for the task. Observe that the optimal strategy
alternates between waste stream reduction and waste remedi-
ation. This is because of the tradeoff between the convex cost
of reducing waste and the linear cost of remediation. Any
further increase in b is satisfied through investing in waste
reduction activities or remediation, but not both. A more
extensive numerical study suggests that the observations in
this paragraph and the previous one are typical.
We also identify some insights for the regulator. Some-
times, remediating all the waste is infeasible, due to techno-
logical constraints. That is, there may be a technologically
feasible range for b. In that case, the regulator needs to select
b carefully, as the total welfare function is not monotonic.
If b∗ is not in the range of feasible b values, then choos-
ing the closest feasible b value does not necessarily give the
maximum possible welfare. As discussed above, the nonmo-
notonicity of the total welfare function is due to the consumer
benefit component. We observe nonmonotonic behavior in
the ranges of b where all the projects comply through simul-
taneous or delayed remediation and no project increases its
investment in waste reduction activities (see Fig. 3). This is
less likely to happen when the number of projects is large and
the projects have significantly different cost and/or network
structures, because then there is typically at least one project
that complies by increasing its investment in waste reduction
activities. Therefore, the less homogeneous project structures
are, the closer to monotonic is the social welfare function.
6. COORDINATED SOLUTIONS
In this section, we consider two approaches to improve on
an uncoordinated solution, by bringing it closer to a globally
optimal solution. In Section 6.1, we consider the use of a sub-
sidy that aligns the objectives of the regulator and the project
companies, assuming that the project companies provide true
information about their data. In Section 6.2, we study the use
of a bonus that encourages truthful reporting by the project
companies.
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6.1. Coordination by Subsidy
We show how the regulator can coordinate the system to
maximize social welfare. We design a subsidy to be paid to
each project company that encourages the company’s invest-
ment in waste reduction activities, simplifies the regulator’s
selection of b, and coordinates the system. Let f 0h be the
cost of project h without regulation. We define the following
subsidy Dh to be paid to each company h:
Dh = min
{
(1 − kh)(fh − f 0h ),
m∑
i=1
nh∑
j=1
λ′hij zhij
− kh(fh − f 0h )
}
. (14)
By definition, the subsidy either fully compensates the
extra cost incurred by project company h due to regulation,
or pays project company h back for all the consumer benefit
generated due to its investment in waste reduction activities
minus the additional cost incurred by the project owner due
to regulation, whichever is less. Hence, the project company
cannot gain more from the subsidy than its increase in cost
due to regulation. The subsidy coordinates the decisions of
the regulator and the project companies, as we now show.
THEOREM 1: With a subsidy defined by (14), if the regu-
lator optimizes its objective subject to Constraints (2)–(6) and
(9), then the optimal values of xhij , yhij , zhij , Chj , and Ch max
obtained directly optimize project company h’s problem for
the chosen vector b.
PROOF: First, consider the case where the subsidy takes
value (1 − kh)(fh − f 0h ). In this situation, the project com-
pany incurs no additional cost compared to the case without
regulation. Hence, deviating from the solution xhij , yhij , zhij ,
Chj , and Ch max that optimizes social welfare cannot generate
higher value for the project company.
Second, consider the case where the subsidy takes value∑m
i=1
∑nh
j=1 λ
′
hij zhij − kh(fh − f 0h ). In such a situation, the
project company’s total value becomes

p′
h = ph + Dh (15)
= Rh + khfh − fh +
m∑
i=1
nh∑
j=1
λ′hij zhij − kh(fh − f 0h ).
(16)
As Rh and f 0h are constants, maximizing (16) is equivalent
to maximizing
−fh +
m∑
i=1
nh∑
j=1
λ′hij zhij . (17)
Whereas, the social welfare W ′ under the subsidy payment
is
W ′ =
s∑
h=1
(
p′
h + eh + ch − Dh) (18)
= −
p∑
h=1
fh +
s∑
h=1
m∑
i=1
(i + λi)
nh∑
j=1
(xhij + yhij + zhij )
+
s∑
h=1
m∑
i=1
nh∑
j=1
λ′hij zhij (1)
= −
s∑
h=1
fh +
s∑
h=1
m∑
i=1
nh∑
j=1
λ′hij zhij
+
s∑
h=1
m∑
i=1
(i + λi)bi
nh∑
j=1
qhij , (19)
where the last equality follows from Lemma 1 and the
last term is independent of the project company’s decision
variables.
Therefore, using the subsidy
∑m
i=1
∑nh
j=1 λ
′
hij zhij−kh(fh−
f 0h ), the values of xhij , yhij , zhij , Chj , and Ch max obtained by
the regulator to optimize (19) also optimize project company
h’s total value (17) for the chosen vector b. 
The use of the subsidy Dh simplifies the decision about b by
the regulator. With the subsidy, as the regulator solves a sin-
gle stage problem, the maximum social welfare is achieved,
subject to truthful reporting by the project companies about
their data. Also, this subsidy structure shows that the regula-
tor may be able to coordinate the system by paying project
companies less than full compensation for the cost of their
compliance. This is because they also benefit from coordi-
nation. Further, the subsidy encourages investment in waste
reduction activities by the project companies. An important
issue is how this subsidy affects the value of the project com-
panies, the consumer benefit, and the environmental gain. In
Section 7, we describe a computational study to investigate
this question and estimate the value of coordination.
Finally, we would like to note that subsidies are widely
criticized because they may create a burden on government
revenues and may end up effectively being paid by taxpayers.
Still, government subsidies have historically been used as an
environmental policy tool [72]. As governments’ budgets for
subsidies shrink, subsidies may come from nongovernmental
entities. An alternative is relying on subsidized-interest loans
(as, for example, in Germany).
6.2. Encouraging Truthful Reporting
The analysis in Section 6.1 assumes that the regulator
has perfect knowledge of the project companies’ time and
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cost parameters. The cost and time for remediation follow
industry standards and can be quoted from third party waste
management companies. However, project companies have
information regarding their costs of compliance, which are
typically unknown to regulators [61]. For example, invest-
ment in waste reduction activities incurs company-specific
costs, and a company may view this information as con-
fidential. In this section, we describe an incentive for a
project company to report its cost of investment in waste
reduction activities to the regulator truthfully. Although rig-
orous enforcement of pollution regulations is an alternative,
in project-based industries it is not easy for a regulator to
know pollution details at the individual task level, and project
companies know that, which increases their temptation to
cheat.
Kwerel [47] studies the issue of misreporting remediation
costs under two pollution control schemes; tradeable permits
and effluent taxes. He proposes a hybrid scheme includ-
ing both tradeable permits and effluent taxes, and shows
that, under this scheme, firms have an incentive to report
their remediation costs truthfully. Dasgupta et al. [23] iden-
tify some limitations of the method proposed by [47], and
describe a two-round communication scheme. They discuss
schemes that induce firms to announce their true cost func-
tions, following the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) public
choice mechanism of [74, 18, 32]. The VCG mechanism
uses a publicly announced bonus scheme to incentivize self-
interested parties to reveal true information to a central reg-
ulator who makes decisions relevant to all the parties. We
study a similar setting, and design a bonus scheme which
the regulator can use to incentivize the project companies to
reveal their true parameters.
We first introduce some notation. Let θ = {θ1, . . . , θs} and
θˆ =
{
θˆ1, . . . , θˆs
}
denote the reported and true parameters
of the project companies, respectively. Here, θh can include
all the parameters1 which project company h uses for its
project scheduling, investment in waste reduction activities,
and remediation decisions, for example, thj , qhij , precedence
relations, and τhij . Thus, θh and θˆh denote the sets of reported
and true parameters of project company h, respectively; and
θ\h = {θ1, . . . , θh−1, θh+1, . . . , θs} denotes the reported para-
meters of companies other than h. For notational convenience,
we denote θ by (θh, θ\h), and
{
θ1, . . . , θh−1, θˆh, θh+1, . . . , θs
}
by (θˆh, θ\h).
For a given regulation vector b, let ph(b, θh) denote
the company value of project h with parameters θh; let
e(b, θh, θ\h) and c(b, θh, θ\h) denote the total environ-
mental gain and total consumer benefit from all the project
1 As aforementioned, certain time and cost parameters (e.g., uhij ,
u′hi , κhij , κ
′
hi) can be estimated from publicly available information
if available. Otherwise, θh can be used to model these parameters.
companies with parameters (θh, θ\h), respectively; and let
W ∗(θ\h) denote the total social welfare from all the project
companies except for company h with parameters θ\h, in an
optimal coordinated solution.
Let Bh(b∗(θh, θ\h), θh, θ\h) be a bonus paid to project com-
pany h under reported parameters (θh, θ\h), where b∗(θh, θ\h)
is the regulation vector in an optimal coordinated solution for
the project companies with parameters (θh, θ\h). For truthful
reporting to be a dominant strategy for project company h, it
is sufficient that, for any θh and θ\h,

p
h(b
∗(θh, θ\h), θˆh) + B(b∗(θh, θ\h), θh, θ\h)
≤ ph(b∗(θˆh, θ\h), θˆh) + B(b∗(θˆh, θ\h), θˆh, θ\h).
That is, no matter how the other project companies
report their parameters, truthfully reporting its parameters
maximizes project company h’s total value.
REMARK 1: Based on the truth inducing mechanism
described by [23], the following bonus for each project
company h is truth inducing:
B(b∗(θh, θ\h), θh, θ\h) = e(b∗(θh, θ\h), θh, θ\h)
+ c(b∗(θh, θ\h), θh, θ\h)
+
∑
k =h

p
k (b
∗(θh, θ\h), θk) − W ∗(θ\h).
(20)
We note that the fourth term, −W ∗(θ\h), of the bonus is
independent of the reported parameters of project h. The
first three terms of the bonus plus the company value of
project h is exactly the total social welfare obtained from
project company h’s perspective. Observing that the regulator
maximizes the total social welfare with reported parameters
(θh, θ\h), reporting its true parameters maximizes project h’s
total value, including the company value and the bonus.
The bonus defined by (20) is the marginal contribution
of project h to the total social welfare under regulation,
minus the company’s value of project h. Using this bonus,
the social welfare is maximized when each company makes
decisions that maximize its total value. Under this bonus
scheme, a company misreporting its information receives less
bonus than when reporting true information, and hence the
bonus can be regarded as a penalty for misreporting in a
general sense. However, regulatory enforcement with arbi-
trary penalty for misreporting can be difficult to implement,
due to the difficulty for a regulator to recognize misreported
information and to differentiate intentional and unintentional
misreporting.
The maximized social welfare is always nonnegative, as
the social welfare is 0 when bi = 0 for every i. However, the
bonus is not necessarily positive. In general, if a project com-
pany is much less efficient at reducing pollutants compared
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with other companies, then its marginal contribution to the
social welfare can be negative, as can its bonus defined by
(20). It is worth noting that the bonus (20) remains truth
inducing if the term −W ∗(θ\h) is replaced by any function
that is independent of the reported parameters of project
company h.
There are some limitations to this bonus scheme. First, the
regulated pollutant system incentivized by the bonus is not
budget balanced. For a system to be budget balanced, the
total value received by all the parties in the system should
be no more than the value generated by the system. In our
problem, to be budget balanced, the total bonus should be no
more than the sum of the environmental benefit and the con-
sumer benefit, which does not always hold. Second, the bonus
scheme suffers from a lack of transparency, that is, the bonus
amount remains unknown until all the firms have reported
their information. This makes the bonus scheme unappealing
to its potential participants. Third, there may be unintentional
inaccuracies in the values that the project company reports,
due, for example, to miscalculation or poor estimation. Our
bonus structure does not resolve this issue. Furthermore, in
practice firms may have other concerns about revealing their
true information, which could make implementation of this
bonus scheme difficult. For example, firms may want to hide
the information from their competitors or even their cus-
tomers. The last three limitations are true for all such bonus
schemes. Hence, despite their truth inducing property and
the fact that such bonus schemes are studied in the litera-
ture, they are not widely used in practice. For other incentive
mechanisms that are designed for environmental protection,
see [20, 21].
7. COMPUTATIONAL STUDY
This section provides computational results that illustrate
the solutions obtained by the regulator and the project com-
panies. There are two main goals of this section. First, we
design a computational study to investigate the effects of the
regulator deviating from an optimal decision in Section 7.1.
Second, in Section 7.2, we study the effectiveness and cost of
the subsidy described in Section 6.1 and the bonus described
in Section 6.2.
7.1. Uncoordinated Solutions
The waste diversion targets chosen by the regulator affect
the project companies’ behavior, which in turn affects the
total social welfare. In practice, multiple different policies
are often considered in the regulatory design process. We
propose four policies, each of which represents a different
approach by the regulator to determine the regulation vector
b with bmax = 1.
1. High Accuracy Policy (HAP): Enumeratively find a
vector b that maximizes social welfare, where each
bi is a multiple of 0.01. This is an approximation
for the optimal solution that can be obtained using
Algorithm 1.
2. Low Accuracy Policy (LAP): Enumeratively find a
vector b that maximizes social welfare, where each bi
is a multiple of 0.1. This policy represents a situation
when the regulator sets targets imprecisely.
3. Greedy Policy (GP): Use the vector b = 1, that is,
bi = 1 for every i. This policy represents a situation
where the regulator maximizes the environmental
benefit.
4. Stepwise Policy (SP): For i = 1, . . . , m, find the
value bi as a multiple of 0.01 that maximizes social
welfare, given b1, . . . , bi−1 values already found and
bi+1, . . . , bm values all equal to 0. This policy rep-
resents a situation where the regulator updates the
current policy by including new pollutants one at a
time.
In practice, HAP is a reasonable policy, as it is quite pre-
cise and setting bi even more precisely is difficult to justify.
We study all these policies for a wide variety of parameter
settings, to obtain robust conclusions. Our data set is cre-
ated by generating project instances using RanGen [25]. For
a given number of tasks, RanGen generates task processing
times from the integer uniform distribution between 1 and
10, that is, thj ∼ UI [1, 10], for all h, j. Let d denote the
density of the precedence graph, that is the ratio of the num-
ber of precedence relations generated, including transitive
relations, to the theoretical maximum number of precedence
relations. We use RanGen to generate project instances with
nh ∈ {10, 20} and d ∈ {0.2, 0.5}. Then, for each instance gen-
erated, we generate pollutant and remediation parameters as
follows:
1. qhij ∼ U [0, thj ], h = 1, . . . , s, i = 1, . . . , m,
j = 1, . . . , nh;
2. τhij ∼ U [0, 1], h = 1, . . . , s, i = 1, . . . , m,
j = 1, . . . , nh;
3. uhij , κhij ∼ U [0, 1], h = 1, . . . , s, i = 1, . . . , m,
j = 1, . . . , nh;
4. u′hi , κ ′hi ∼ U [0, 0.4], h = 1, . . . , s, i = 1, . . . , m,
j = 1, . . . , nh.
Thus, in our setting, on average a type of pollutant of a task
requires simultaneous and delayed remediation times that are
1/4 and 1/10 of the task processing time, respectively. We then
generate λ′hij ∼ U [0, .4], ∀h, i, j . To separate the effects of
waste reduction and remediation, we let u′′hij = 0, ∀h, i, j
and λi = 0, ∀i. For each project h, we let the fixed project
revenue Rh equal the project cost when there is no waste
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Table 5. Distribution of social welfare for different policies.
HAP LAP GP SP
p e c p e c p e c p e c
nh = 10 −16.69 24.48 9.76 −17.37 24.98 9.74 −91.47 69.33 11.91 −16.46 24.28 9.69
nh = 20 −32.89 51.24 20.21 −32.68 50.98 19.91 −172.02 135.32 24.11 −32.37 50.72 20.14
d = 0.2 −24.81 38.27 15.09 −25.13 38.46 14.94 −130.91 102.39 18.19 −24.34 37.80 15.03
d = 0.5 −24.76 37.44 14.88 −24.91 37.51 14.70 −132.58 102.26 17.82 −24.48 37.19 14.79
m = 1 −12.82 19.48 8.98 −13.53 19.99 9.00 −90.58 61.35 11.79 −12.82 19.48 8.98
m = 2, E −27.03 40.96 18.42 −26.84 40.71 18.10 −153.52 122.86 21.30 −26.50 40.46 18.30
m = 2, N −34.51 53.14 17.55 −34.70 53.24 17.37 −151.14 122.76 20.94 −33.91 52.55 17.45
Overall −24.79 37.86 14.98 −25.02 37.98 14.82 −131.74 102.33 18.01 −24.41 37.50 14.91
diversion requirement, that is, when bi = 0 for every pollutant
i. We also let the variable project revenue parameter kh = 0.
For simplicity, we let δ = 1. Under these parameter settings,
the project company value is scaled to be nonpositive, but the
environmental gain and the consumer benefit are both non-
negative. The purpose for choosing these parameter settings
is to ensure that the project company value, the environmental
gain, and the consumer benefit consist only of components
that are affected by decisions about waste remediation and
reduction.
The problem instances we consider contain s ∈ {5, 10}
projects. We consider three scenarios for m and . First, we let
m = 1 and 1 = 0.2. Second, we let m = 2 and 1 = 2 = 0.2.
Third, we let m = 2, 1 = 0.1 and 2 = 0.3. Thus, for parame-
ters nh ∈ {10, 20} , d ∈ {0.2, 0.5} , s ∈ {5, 10}, and the three
scenarios for m and , we have 2 × 2 × 2 × 3 = 24 combi-
nations for problem settings, for each of which we generate
10 problem instances, for a total of 240 instances.
To understand the implications of each policy, we address
the following questions:
i. In a regulated environment, how is the social welfare
allocated among the stakeholders?
ii. By how much does social welfare decrease as the
regulator moves away from the best solution?
iii. By how much do the project cost and time increase
as a result of regulation?
iv. How do companies divide their compliance activities
between waste remediation and waste reduction?
The first two questions consider the regulator’s decisions.
We identify how the total welfare changes and who pays
for the regulation cost. The last two questions consider the
project company’s decisions. We study the compliance cost
and the cost minimizing compliance methods, under regu-
lation. Table 5 summarizes how the distribution of the total
social welfare is affected by the parameters nh, d, m, and .
We observe that the environmental gains of Policy GP come
at much higher cost for the project companies. Recall that
Table 6. Percentage loss of social welfare, relative to HAP, for
different policies.
LAP0.05 LAP0.1 LAP0.2 GP SP
s = 5 0.47 1.16 3.96 159.01 0.25
s = 10 0.35 1.02 3.72 163.75 0.13
nh = 10 0.42 1.20 4.25 176.81 0.19
nh = 20 0.40 0.97 3.43 145.95 0.19
d = 0.2 0.37 1.05 3.98 160.66 0.17
d = 0.5 0.45 1.12 3.70 162.10 0.21
m = 1 0.48 1.25 5.54 214.95 0.00
m = 2, E 0.40 1.20 3.99 140.50 0.28
m = 2, N 0.35 0.81 1.99 128.69 0.29
Overall 0.41 1.09 3.84 161.38 0.19
Policy GP represents the regulator imposing high waste diver-
sion targets. In this case, the results in Table 5 imply that high
waste reduction targets lead to unbalanced outcomes with no
pollution, but with excessive project costs. Table 5 also shows
that the allocation of the environmental gains increases, while
the allocation of consumer benefit decreases, with pollutant
heterogeneity, as in the case of m = 2, N .
Next, we consider how the percentage loss of social wel-
fare generated by the other policies relative to that by HAP
is affected by the parameters s, nh, d, m, and . Observing
that Policy LAP naturally causes welfare loss due to its use
of relatively large increments in enumerating each bi value,
we now extend Policy LAP to enumerate each bi as a mul-
tiple of 0.05, 0.1, and 0.2, denoted by LAP0.05, LAP0.1, and
LAP0.2, respectively. The results are summarized in Table 6.
Evidently, the welfare loss increases with the degree of inac-
curacy Policy LAP uses. Interestingly, Policy SP provides a
loss of social welfare that is only about one fifth that of Pol-
icy LAP0.1. Therefore, it should be possible to add regulatory
requirements for additional pollutants without changing the
existing requirements. Further, our results show that Policy
SP performs substantially better as the number of projects
increases.
As expected, compliance with regulations such as CAL-
Green increases project completion time and cost [30]. Note
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Table 7. Percentage increase in project cost and time due to
regulation under different policies
HAP LAP GP SP
f h Ch max f h Ch max f h Ch max f h Ch max
s = 5 13.93 2.32 14.11 2.39 71.43 22.77 13.66 2.24
s = 10 13.25 1.95 13.40 2.03 71.88 22.88 13.07 1.92
nh = 10 10.70 1.78 11.14 1.94 59.69 19.88 10.53 1.75
nh = 20 16.48 2.49 16.37 2.48 83.62 25.78 16.19 2.40
d = 0.2 16.13 2.46 16.38 2.55 84.73 26.77 15.80 2.37
d = 0.5 11.05 1.81 11.13 1.86 58.58 18.89 10.93 1.78
m = 1 6.99 0.72 7.41 0.84 48.61 18.00 6.99 0.72
m = 2, E 14.65 1.88 14.60 1.93 83.89 25.42 14.32 1.81
m = 2, N 19.13 3.81 19.26 3.85 82.46 25.06 18.78 3.70
Overall 13.59 2.14 13.76 2.21 71.65 22.83 13.36 2.08
that we assume that once b is given, the project companies
must comply with the regulation requirement. Symmetrically
with Policy GP where b = 1, a firm greedy policy implies
that b = 0, that is, no regulation. We study the magnitude of
increases over project completion time and cost relative to the
case with b = 0. Table 7 shows the increment in the project
cost (f h) and in the completion time of a project including
its waste diversion (Ch max), relative to a situation with no
regulation, for the four policies. Observe that, in the absence
of environmental regulation, the project cost is equal to the
project completion time. The results in Table 7 show that all
the policies except GP mitigate the incremental costs of envi-
ronmental regulation rather effectively, typically to less than
14%. Moreover, project completion times typically increase
less than 3%.
A surprising observation from Table 7 is that the incremen-
tal cost and time from regulation are significantly less when
the number of precedence relations is greater. One explana-
tion for this result is that, when d is high, the initial project cost
is higher and thus the percentage increase is lower. A second
explanation follows from the tradeoff between the different
welfare components. When projects have more precedence
relations, it is more difficult and costlier to comply with regu-
lations, because there is less slack time between the activities
that can be used for remediation. Therefore, a higher waste
diversion target results in higher project cost, and lower total
welfare. For this reason, the welfare maximizing bi value
and the percentage increase in project costs are smaller when
projects are denser.
Finally, we observe that a larger increase in project cost
and project completion time occurs where the two pollutants
have different levels of environmental benefit when diverted.
This outcome results from the fact that the project cost func-
tion is convex and increasing in b. We consider the case
where the pollutants have the same environmental benefit
from diversion (E : 1 = 2 = 0.2), and where pollu-
tants have different environmental benefits from diversion
(N : 1 = 0.1 and 2 = 0.3). When i = 0.3, the corre-
sponding optimal bi is higher, and meeting the higher bi value
requires more waste diversion, which is costlier and requires
more time. Differences between the results for Policies HAP,
LAP, and SP are not significant.
It is important to understand how project companies
respond to regulation. Table 8 summarizes the percentages by
which waste is reduced by simultaneous remediation, delayed
remediation, and waste stream reduction activities, using the
four policies. The results show that, under Policy GP, project
companies predominantly use delayed remediation. This is
because slack times are filled by simultaneous remediation,
and the cost of waste reduction activities increases in a con-
vex way. The other three policies achieve remediation by
about 13, 6, and 14% on average using delayed remediation,
simultaneous remediation, and waste reduction, respectively.
These results are quite stable across the parameter ranges
studied, except that the prevalence of delayed remediation
increases with the number of precedence relations, the num-
ber of pollutants, and the pollutant heterogeneity. The results
for Policy GP show that unreasonably high waste diversion
requirements do not encourage more waste reduction than
welfare maximizing waste diversion requirements do. When
faced with stringent waste reduction requirements, project
companies use delayed remediation instead of simultaneous
remediation or waste stream reduction. Hence, our results
imply that imposing high waste diversion targets may not be
completely successful in terms of incentivizing waste stream
reduction activities.
7.2. Coordinated Solutions
We next consider coordinated solutions, where the regu-
lator selects a vector b and pays a subsidy Dh, as defined by
(14), to each project company h. As a result, project compa-
nies invest in waste reduction activities and make remediation
decisions that maximize the total social welfare.
We evaluate the distribution of the social welfare, the
subsidy, and the increase in total social welfare from the
coordinated policy relative to that of Policy HAP, the best
uncoordinated solution with direct regulation, and summa-
rize the results in Table 9. Compared with the distribution
of the social welfare obtained by Policy HAP, the project
cost and the consumer benefit both increase significantly, but
the environmental benefit increases by only a small amount.
The subsidy is slightly smaller than the consumer benefit.
After receiving the subsidy, the project company’s costs are
significantly reduced, as shown in column psubs. Compared
instance by instance, coordinated solutions offer on average
19% more value in social welfare than Policy HAP in the
uncoordinated case. The percentage gain in social welfare is
stable across the parameters considered.
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Table 8. Percentage waste diversion approaches for different policies: simultaneous remediation (Smt), delayed remediation, and waste
reduction (Red)
HAP LAP GP SP
Smt Delayed Red Smt Delayed Red Smt Delayed Red Smt Delayed Red
s = 5 12.67 6.70 14.54 12.90 6.91 14.43 20.03 62.50 17.48 12.61 6.43 14.49
s = 10 13.06 5.80 14.32 13.22 6.04 14.23 20.86 61.41 17.73 12.97 5.69 14.25
nh = 10 11.40 6.32 14.21 11.67 6.73 14.16 18.84 63.67 17.49 11.28 6.15 14.13
nh = 20 14.33 6.18 14.65 14.46 6.22 14.49 22.04 60.24 17.72 14.30 5.97 14.61
d = 0.2 13.74 5.69 14.48 14.05 5.96 14.44 22.20 59.96 17.84 13.66 5.48 14.44
d = 0.5 11.99 6.80 14.37 12.07 6.99 14.21 18.68 63.95 17.37 11.92 6.64 14.30
m = 1 13.24 3.96 14.46 13.72 4.27 14.51 23.21 58.05 18.74 13.24 3.96 14.46
m = 2, E 12.74 5.14 14.70 12.76 5.29 14.47 19.26 63.56 17.17 12.58 4.97 14.62
m = 2, N 12.62 9.64 14.12 12.71 9.86 14.01 18.85 64.25 16.90 12.56 9.26 14.03
Overall 12.87 6.25 14.43 13.06 6.47 14.33 20.44 61.95 17.60 12.79 6.06 14.37
Table 9. Distribution of social welfare for solutions coordinated
by subsidy
Gain
p e c Subsidy psubs Gain (%)
s = 5 −20.86 26.35 16.69 16.56 −4.30 3.43 18.98
s = 10 −40.42 51.42 33.37 33.23 −7.19 7.03 19.09
nh = 10 −20.72 25.43 16.18 16.14 −4.58 3.34 19.64
nh = 20 −40.55 52.34 33.88 33.64 −6.91 7.11 18.43
d = 0.2 −30.73 39.25 25.45 25.29 −5.44 5.41 19.35
d = 0.5 −30.54 38.52 24.61 24.49 −6.05 5.04 18.72
m = 1 −16.19 20.06 14.72 14.55 −1.65 2.95 19.48
m = 2, E −33.73 41.88 30.50 30.26 −3.47 6.31 19.54
m = 2, N −41.99 54.71 29.87 29.87 −12.12 6.42 18.09
Overall −30.64 38.89 25.03 24.89 −5.75 5.23 19.04
Next, we study how the bonus in (20) and the project com-
pany value are affected by different factors. We compare the
cost and effectiveness of the bonus defined by (20) and the
subsidy defined by (14). We note that the bonus achieves the
same social welfare as the subsidy for every instance, as they
both coordinate the system. Our results are summarized in
Table 10. Columns Bonus and pbonus show the bonus and the
company value with the bonus paid, respectively. Columns
% Bonus
ebonus+cbonus and %
Bonus
Subsidy show the bonus as a percentage of
the environmental benefit plus consumer benefit, and of the
subsidy, respectively. With the bonus, the project companies
gain extra value by remediating pollutants, especially when
the pollutant heterogeneity is high. The bonus needed is on
average no more than 80% of the total of the environmental
benefit and consumer benefit generated by the company, and
thus typically does not create a budget deficit. Finally, the
bonus is on average about twice the subsidy. However, we do
observe cases where the total bonus paid to the project compa-
nies is negative. We find that the bonus needed is substantially
higher where the two pollutants have different levels of envi-
ronmental benefit when remediated. This is because higher
pollutant heterogeneity leads to larger optimal values of bi ,
Table 10. Effectiveness of the bonus
Bonus pbonus %
Bonus
ebonus+cbonus
% BonusSubsidy
s = 5 32.10 11.25 72.29 188.78
s = 10 62.50 22.09 73.14 188.04
nh = 10 31.28 10.56 72.52 188.15
nh = 20 63.33 22.78 72.91 188.68
d = 0.2 46.30 15.57 69.93 180.03
d = 0.5 48.30 17.76 75.50 196.80
m = 1 24.44 8.25 70.10 171.88
m = 2, E 50.71 16.98 69.43 166.20
m = 2, N 66.77 24.78 78.62 227.16
Overall 47.30 16.67 72.72 188.41
and thus a higher marginal contribution to social welfare.
This observation does not apply to the subsidy in Table 9.
The reason is that the subsidy is bounded above by the con-
sumer benefit (14), and as the consumer benefit is insensitive
to pollutant heterogeneity, so too is the subsidy.
The distribution of total social welfare among company
value, environmental gain, and consumer benefit is scaled
by the weighting parameters i , λi , and λ′hij . In the studies
reported above, we use a fixed scheme in generating these
parameters. We now study how these parameters affect the
distribution of total social welfare in a coordinated solution.
Specifically, we generate each of the three parameters from
uniform intervals [0,0.1], [0.1,0.2], [0.2,0.3], [0.3,0.4], and
[0.4,0.5]. Hence, there are 5 × 5 × 5 = 125 combinations
of these parameters. Further, we still vary the parameters
s, nh, d, and m as in our earlier studies, and generate 10
instances for each parameter combination, for a total of
125 × 16 × 10 = 20, 000 random instances. The results
are summarized in Table 11. First, company value strongly
decreases with i and λi following a similar pattern, and
decreases slightly with λ′hij . This is because the parameters i
and λi play the same role in encouraging both direct remedia-
tion and waste stream reduction, whereas the parameter λ′hij
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Table 11. Distribution of social welfare by different weights.
p e c
i ∼ U [0, 0.1] −69.75 14.97 122.92
i ∼ U [0.1, 0.2] −92.18 53.71 138.23
i ∼ U [0.2, 0.3] −111.65 103.54 146.81
i ∼ U [0.3, 0.4] −124.56 157.97 149.82
i ∼ U [0.4, 0.5] −128.70 206.87 150.57
λi ∼ U [0, 0.1] −69.46 90.60 47.20
λi ∼ U [0.1, 0.2] −92.66 105.02 88.15
λi ∼ U [0.2, 0.3] −111.54 111.65 138.91
λi ∼ U [0.3, 0.4] −125.07 114.78 192.73
λi ∼ U [0.4, 0.5] −128.10 114.99 241.36
λ′hij ∼ U [0, 0.1] −97.13 106.70 111.08
λ′hij ∼ U [0.1, 0.2] −99.82 106.79 122.93
λ′hij ∼ U [0.2, 0.3] −104.21 107.54 138.93
λ′hij ∼ U [0.3, 0.4] −109.58 108.08 157.27
λ′hij ∼ U [0.4, 0.5] −116.09 107.94 178.13
Overall −105.37 107.41 141.67
only affects waste stream reduction [see (8)]. Second, the
environmental gain increases strongly with i and slightly
with λi , and is not affected by λ′hij . Third, consumer benefit
increases slightly with i , strongly with λi , and moderately
with λ′hij . The last two findings occur because the parameter
i directly affects environmental gain and the parameter λi
directly affects consumer benefit, in both direct remediation
and waste stream reduction; whereas, the parameter λ′hij only
affects consumer benefit in waste stream reduction.
Finally, we study the impacts of unintentional information
inaccuracies, as mentioned in Section 6.2. We focus on infor-
mation inaccuracy regarding the removable amount of pollu-
tant qhij . Let the reported value be denoted by qˆhij = rqhij ,
where r represents the degree of information inaccuracy.
We consider three scenarios for r: (1) random errors where
r ∼ U [0.9, 1.1]; (2) underestimates where r ∼ U [0.9, 1];
and (3) overestimates where r ∼ U [1, 1.1]. We find that the
three scenarios of misreporting all reduce the total social wel-
fare by an amount between 2 and 4%, compared with accurate
reporting. For project cost, environmental gain and consumer
benefit, overreporting under scenario 3 has the largest impact.
On average it reduces total project cost by 5.2%, reduces envi-
ronmental gain by 4.61%, and reduces consumer benefit by
1.49%. The impacts of random errors and underreporting are
less evident and do not follow a consistent pattern. In sum-
mary, information inaccuracies have a negative impact on
total social welfare as expected, and overreporting of pol-
lutant quantity typically benefits project companies at the
expense of the environment and consumers.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The construction industry is among the major sources
of waste and pollution in industrialized nations. Moreover,
commercial activities within the construction industry are
typically organized as projects, as they are in ship and aircraft
building, and in film making. This organizational structure
has significant implications for the ways in which compa-
nies respond to environmental regulation. These implications
motivate us to study the environmental regulation of project
companies. We consider the decisions of a regulator, and the
decisions made in response by project companies. The reg-
ulator’s problem of maximizing social welfare is modeled
as a bilevel nonlinear program. We describe a subsidy for
investment in waste reduction activities that coordinates the
decisions of the regulator and the project companies. We also
describe a bonus that ensures truthful reporting by project
companies about their remediation costs and other data that
the regulator does not directly observe. Finally, we investigate
the implications of the regulator deviating from an optimal
decision, for (a) total social welfare, (b) average project cost
and time, and (c) project companies’ waste diversion policy
choices.
Our work provides several implications for project com-
panies operating in industries that are environmentally reg-
ulated. First, we identify the optimal strategy for complying
with regulations, and find that increases in waste diversion
targets are satisfied through remediation or waste reduction,
but not both. As they need to quote to project owners, project
companies have a significant concern about by how much
regulation will increase project cost and completion time.
Our results suggest that, in industries where project struc-
tures have higher density, the percentage increase in project
cost due to regulation is lower than where project structures
are sparse. Further, if the regulated pollutants have different
levels of environmental impact, larger increases in project
cost and completion time occur.
We also provide several implications for regulators. For
example, it is important for regulators to understand the struc-
ture of projects in their industry. When projects have similar
network structures, the total welfare function is typically a
nonmonotonic function of the waste diversion target, which
makes it harder to estimate the effect of regulation on social
welfare. The results of our computational study emphasize
the importance of identifying welfare maximizing regulatory
parameters. Imposing stringent waste diversion targets typi-
cally results in unbalanced outcomes with no pollution, but
with excessive project costs; it also fails to encourage waste
stream reduction. Finally, a positive result is that it should be
possible to add regulatory requirements for more pollutants
without changing the existing requirements. This results in
only a small sacrifice in the total social welfare, relative to
resetting all waste diversion targets, which could be disruptive
to companies and result in poor public relations.
Several interesting issues remain open for further research.
First, a computationally efficient algorithm can be developed
for the regulator’s bilevel quadratic program. Second, a more
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general problem that allows for task expediting or “crashing”
can be considered. Crashing can be used to compensate for
the project lengthening effects of remediation. Third, project
resource constraints can be considered in a more general
model. Fourth, it should be possible to develop a more general
model in which each project company owns several projects,
which would allow for the modeling of learning effects and
economies of scope or scale. Finally, the design of environ-
mental regulations that are customized, either for individual
project companies or for sectors of a project-based industry,
should be studied. We hope that our work will encourage
further research on these important issues.
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